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NOTES
LIABILITY OF THE REAL ESTATE OF A DECEDENT FOR HIS UNRECORDED DEBTS
When a person dies owing debts which have not been
reduced to judgment and made a part of the court records
against him, any real estate which he may leave is, by law,
made an asset for the payment of these debts. Although
the primary fund for the payment of a decedent's debts is
his personalty, yet the legislature at an early date in Pennsylvania made the decedent's real estate conditionally responsible therefor. The length of time during which the
land is liable for the payment of these debts has been gradually reduced by various enactments.
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE IN PENNSYLVANIA
The foundation for this theory in Pennsylvania was
laid in a clause in the original charter to William Penn
whereby the freemen of the Province were authorized to
"alter the law of England in regard to the descent and enjoyment of lands".' In England at the time of the founding of this Province lands of a decedent were not unrestrictedly made assets for the payment of his debts.
In pursuance of this clause, the first General Assembly
in December 7, 1682, with Penn's approval modified the
English law.2 The act of May 3, 1693 made all lands liable
for payment of debts without any limitations in favor of
heirs.3
Other laws to the same effect were passed in 1697,'
1700, and 1705,5 and thus the rule became firmly and finally
established in Pennsylvania that the lands of a deceased
person whether in the hands of an heir, devisee or even a
1

Duke of York's Book of Laws p. 84.
2Ibid. p. 120.
Ibid. p. 230.
'Ibid. p. 264.
61 Smith's Laws 7, 57.
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bona fide purchaser from them, were liable for his debts
and that this liability extended without limit of time.
Recognizing the inconveniences that arose from such
secret and unlimited claims and to cure this evil, the legislature gradually shortened the period for the bringing of
actions by Section 2 of the Act of April 19, 1794 as supplemented by Section 4 of the Act of April 4, 1797,6 to seven
years after the decease of the debtor. Under the acts of
1794 and 1797 the decedent's land might be sold on a judgment against the executor or administrator only, without
notice to the widow, heir or devisee.7 These acts were followed by others and reduced the time within which actions
must be brought to five years by the Act of February 24,
1834,8 Secs. 24 and 34, as result of Fritz v. Evans, 13 S. &
R. 9; to two years by the Act of June 8, 1893, 9 June 14,
1901, ' 0 May 3, 1909;"- to one year by the Act of June 7,
191712 Sec. 15 (a) as amended June 7, 1919.1
Strictly speaking, the Acts of 1700 and 1705 had not
created the unsecured debts of a decedent, "liens" against
his real estate. Their effect was to make his real estate
in the hands of his heirs and devisees or purchasers from
them, assets for the payment of his debts, the same as personal property in the hands of his executors or administrators."4
The present law is embodied in the Fiduciaries Act of
June 7, 1917,15 Sec. 15 (a) as amended June 7, 1919,16 limiting the statutory period to one year and providing the procedure for instituting and indexing actions.
63 Smith's Laws 143, 297.

?Fritz v. Evans, 13 S. & R. 9 (1825); Sergeant v. Ewing, 36 Pa.
156 (1860).
OP. L. 70.
OP. L. 392.

10P. L. 562.

,1p. L. 386.

12p. L. 447.
iOp, L. 412.

L'Spear v. Hannum, I Yeates 380, 533 (1794), (1795).

15P. L. 447.
i6P. L. 412.
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PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE

This doctrine is the result of the law's policy to give
to the creditor some security for the collection of his claim
apart from the debtor's personal estate through a lien of
17
general debts against the debtor's land.
These statutes are ones of limitation and repose for
the benefit of widows, heirs and devisees, those claiming
under them, and purchasers.1 8 Because the Pennsylvania
courts favor the heir, they require of the creditor a vigilant prosecution of his demands in the mode pointed out by
the statute. 19 Where a creditor has "slept on his rights"
he cannot look to the real estate for the payment of his
claims. The creditor has the right, however, to bring his
action against the executor of the decedent and to prosecute the same to judgment irrespective of the Act of 1917.
Any judgment obtained therein would not be a lien on the
decedent's real estate, but would entitle the creditor to
share in the distribution of any personalty that might come
into the executor's hands.
The Orphans' Court has. no jurisdiction to authorize a
sale of the decedent's real estate, if all liens have been lost
for want of suit or prosecution. 20 If the Orphans' Court
does authorize a sale when there are no debts which are
liens, no title will pass and the sale may be attacked collaterally by the heirs in ejectment ;21 and the heirs will
take the surplus, even as against scheduled debts, if the
creditor has not kept his lien alive pending the sale and
confirmation thereof.22 The proper practice is to petition
17

Davidson v. Bright, 267 Pa. 580, 586 (1920).
Commonwealth v. Beachly, 262 Pa. 545 (1919); Kerper v. Hoch,

18

1 Watts 9 (1832).

19Bindley's Appeal 69 Pa. 295 (1871).
2
OPry's Appeal, 8 Watts 253 (1839); Clauser's Estate, 1 W. & S.
208, 215 .(1841); Aurand's Estate, 40 C. C. 343, (1913).
21
Smith v. Ribblett, 233 Pa. 300 (1912); Smith v. Wildman, 178
Pa. 245 (1896).
22Bindley's

180, 185 (1911).

Appeal, 69 Pa. 295 (1871); Dolan's Estate, 231 Pa.
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for a rule to show cause why the order directing such sale
23
should not be vacated and set aside.
No admission, however solemn, will dispense with a strict
compliance with the statutory mode if the lien is to remain
against the land. 2' Nor is an award in favor of a creditor
made by the Orphans' Court equivalent to an action under
the statute.2 5 But where an action has already been
started within the proper time an award is a sufficient
"prosecution to judgment", by Act of 1919.26
However, where a creditor has failed duly to protect
himself by establishing a lien against the real estate, he
may still participate in the proceeds of a sale of such property by the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion. 27 Under the Act of 1917 if the debt is due at decedent's death the creditor must begin an action thereon in
assumpsit within one year after the debtor's death against
the executor or administrator and index it against the decedent and his legal representatives. 2 The action is in the
Common Pleas court. It has two functions-it gives notice
of the claim (by indexing the action as soon as begun in
the general judgment index) and it preserves a lien on any
real estate within that county for a period of five years.
The mere filing of the claim with the executor or administrator will not preserve the lien, but the creditor must actually
start suit within one year after the debtor's decease. The
proceeding is strictly in rem. 29 The action after having
been properly instituted must be "duly prosecuted to judgment". The question whether it has been duly prosecuted
to judgment is one for the court and not for the jury 0 In
instituting the action by the issuance of a summons, it is
advisable to join the surviving spouse, heirs and devisees in
23Aurand's
24

Estate, 22 D. R. 343.

Hemphill v. Carpenter, 6 Watts 22; Oliver's Appeal, 101 Pa. 299

(1882).

25

Smith v. Ribblett, 233 Pa. 300 (1912).

26p.
2

L. 412.

7Brennan's Estate, 277 Pa. 509, 511 (1923).
28
Myers v. Lohr, 72 Pa. Super. Ct. 472 (1919).
9Soles v. Hickman, 29 Pa. 342, 346 (1857).
BOPhillips v. Railroad Co., 107 Pa. 472 (1885).
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the original action,2 ' rather than to bring them in later by
a scire facias because there is a definite time within which
the creditor must proceed against the surviving spouse and
heirs or devisees, i. e., when they must be made "parties
to the action". The scire facias making the spouse and
heirs or devisees parties to the action must be issued within five years after the expiration of the period for commencing suit (within six years from the decease of the
debtor)."2 If the creditor has failed to bring in the heirs,
etc., within the proper time he cannot proceed to execute
his judgment against the decedent's real estate. The usual
practice in instituting action under the act is the service of
summons on the executor or administrator, and the acceptance of service by him which is docketed "decedent per
representative". The creditor should make certain of this
service and not rely on the sheriff. The creditor at the
time of the issuance of the summons should require that
notice of the suit be served on all the heirs, etc. This is
necessary if any subsequent judgment is to be binding on
the real estate.
If the claim is not due at the debtor's death and does not
mature until more than one year after his death the creditor
files a statement which gives notice of his claim until it
becomes due. The creditor has one year after his cause
of action arises to start action thereon. 3 The creditor
files in the office of the Prothonotary of the county where
the action is to be instituted and also in the county where
the real estate is situated, a statement of his claim and has
it indexed in accordance with the provisions of the Fiduciaries Act. The filing of the statement of the creditor's
claim within one year of the decedent's death constitutes a
notice to all the parties in interest of the possibility of
bringing an action-of assumpsit after the demand becomes
due. 84 When the claim becomes due the creditor files a
aKirk v. Van Horn, 265 Pa. 549 (1920).
32

McMurray's Adm's. v. Hopper, 43 Pa. 468, 471 (1862); Hope v.
Marshall, 96 Pa. 395 (1880).
38Pyles v. Bosler, 11 D. & C. 38 (1928).
"Commonwealth v. Cooper, 192 Pa. 424 (1899).
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praecipe in assumpsit joining the owner of the land and
refers to the prior proceeding to continue the lien of the
claim against the real estate of the decedent.
The statutory lien is not the same as the lien of a
mortgage or judgment, for a decedent may, by an imper-,
ative power given to his executors to sell his land for the
payment of his debts, relieve the land from the lien of his
general debts which he cannot do as to liens of record and
the unsecured creditors are remitted to the fund realized
from such sale.3 5 The purchaser takes the land subject to
recorded debts but gets it free from the general debts when
he buys it under this absolute power of sale. However,
where the power of sale is discretionary, conversion takes
place only when the land is sold. In the meantime and
from the moment of the testator's death general debts have
acquired a lien which can be continued or divested only in
the mode provided by statute.3
When a creditor has failed to take the proper steps to
enforce his remedy for the collection of his claim until
after the period limited by statute, the land is discharged
of liability and the heir or devisee holds it free and clear
thereof. Laxity on the creditor's part also deprives him of
the right to have the rents from the real estate of the
decedent, though ordinarily they are regarded as personal
property, applied to the payment of the alleged claims
after the expiration of the statutory period. The only effect of the judgment is to prevent the lapse of the statutory lien and not to create a new one. 37 This lien continues
to the end of five years from and after the date prescribed
for the commencement of the action, whether judgment be
recovered during the first or the second period, 8 because
it is not the judgment rendered against the personal representative that confers the quality of the lien on the debts
35

Cadbury v. Duval, 10 Pa. 265 (1849); Seeds v. Burk, 181 Pa.

281 (1897).
58

Seeds v. Burk, 181 Pa. 281, 288 (1897); Hunt's Appeal, 105 Pa.
128 (1884); Chamberlain's Estate, 257 Pa. 113 (1917).
3
7Trevor v. Ellenberger, 2 P. & W. 94 (1830).
3
SHope v. Marshall, 96 Pa. 395 (1880).
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of the deceased person. This dates everywhere from his
death. 9
From a consideration of the many cases construing the
various acts which the legislature has passed on the subject, we can discern a disposition on the part of the courts
to impose a strict construction on these statutes which do
not create a lien but limit its duration only. If a creditor
is to avail himself of the statutory remedy he must carefully follow the procedure set forth in the acts.
Leo F. Dodson

COMMENTING ON THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
IN THE CHARGE TO THE JURY
In the majority of states, usually because of statutory
or constitutional provisions, trial courts are not permitted,
in charging juries, to comment on the facts, or express an
opinion on the weight of the evidence or the credibility of
witnesses.' There the jury prevails as the sole fact finding agency, divorced from all suggestions and leads of the
trial court.2 Any remark made by a judge, whether direct
or indirect, intentional or inadvertent, from which the
jury may infer what his opinion is, as to the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the evidence, or any part of it pertinent to
the issue, is error.3 However, at common law and in Pennsylvania it is not error for the trial court in its charge to
the jury to express an opinion on disputed questions of
fact, provided such questions are ultimately left to the jury
for their decision, without any direction as to how they
89Breden

v. Agnew, 8 Pa. 233, 236 (1848).

138 Cyc. 1646; Tait v. Murphy, 80 Ala. 440; Randolph v. McCain,
34 Ark. 696; Miller v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 502; Stacy v. Cobbs, 36 Ill.
349; Goss v. Calkins, 162 Mass. 492; Ross v. State, 29 Tex. 499.
2State v. Williams, 31 S. C. 4.
WFuhrman v. Huntsville, 54 Ala. 263; State v. Ah Tong, 7 Nev.
148; State v. Dick. 60 N. C. 440,

